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INTRODUCTION

The Presidential election of 2000 was unprecedented. The outcome of the
election came down to the result in Florida. In the end, the State's popular vote was
so close that the election became as much a legal as a political matter. Mighty
lawyers were arrayed, and the Florida and United States Supreme Courts rendered
opinions in two cases each.
The first case involved a decision by the Secretary of State of Florida
concerning the deadline for submitting county election returns. To allow sufficient
time for contest lawsuits under Florida law, the Florida Supreme Court extended
the deadline imposed by the Secretary to November 26, 2000.2 George W. Bush
challenged that ruling, which the United States Supreme Court then vacated with
a request that the Florida Supreme Court clarify the federal questions plausibly
raised in the litigation? Since this unanimous opinion was measured and
*Assistant ProfessorofPolitical Science, University ofNorth Florida; AdjunctProfessor, Florida
Coastal School of Law. J.D., Ph. D., University of California, Hastings and Santa Barbara. I wish to
thank Pat Plumlee, Terry Bowen, MattCorrigan, Don Berglund, and Alaina Dartt for their feedback on
this project.
1. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1225-27 (Fla. 2000). The
closeness of the election had triggered not only the automatic recount for which Florida law provides,
but a request by the Florida Democratic Executive Committee for manual recounts in select counties.
Id. at 1225. Concerned thattherecounts would notbe completedbefore thestatutory deadline, the Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board sought an advisory opinion from the Florida Division of Elections
interpreting that deadline. Id. Based on that advisory opinion, which ruled that returns must ordinarily
be received by 5 p.m. on the seventh day following the election, Secretary of State Katherine Harris
issued a statement that she would ignore returns after Tuesday, November 14, 2000, at 5 p.m. Id. at
1226. In response, theVolusia County CanvassingBoard sought a declaratoryjudgment that the county
was not bound by this deadline, and the trial court ruled that though the deadline was mandatory, the
Secretary could exercise discretion whether to accept late returns. Id. The Florida Supreme Court
invalidated that ruling and extended the deadline for final certification of county ballots. Id. at 1240.
2. Id. at 1240.
3. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70,78 (2000) (per curiam). The three
federal questions ultimately considered arerooted inArticle II, Section 1,Clause 2, ofthe United States
Constitution, which entrusts to state legislatures themannerofselecting electors forPresident and Vice
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appropriate,4 it was not the focus of much debate. The second case, however, has
been the center of great controversy.
Bush v. Gore5 picked up where Palm Beach County v. Harris left off. On
November 26, 2000, the deadline imposed in Palm Beach County v. Harris for

receiving all county voting returns,' the Florida Election Canvassing Commission
certified the results of the Florida election and declared Mr. Bush the winner of
Florida's electoral votes.7 The next day, Vice President Al Gore filed suit in Leon
County under the contest provision of Florida law' seeking a manual recount on
grounds that the Canvassing Commission had included a number of illegal votes
and excluded a number of legal votes.9 Following a two-day evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied all relief, and its judgment was appealed and the issue certified
to the Florida Supreme Court.1" On December 8, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court
reversed the trial court, ordering the adjustment of vote totals in particular counties
and an immediate statewide manual recount of undervotes, using the "clear
indication of the intent of the voter" standard of Florida law."' Mr. Bush challenged
this ruling under the federal questions cited above, and the next day the United
States Supreme Court issued a stay of the order pending briefing and oral
argument. 2 On December 11, 2000, the Court vacated the order, terminating the
election and leaving Bush the winner. 3
The majority opinion presented the views of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas on the Equal Protection Clause
and 3 U.S.C. § 5 issues. 4 The Chief Justice filed the only concurrence, in which
Justices Scalia and Thomasjoined.' Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer
dissented from the majority opinion. 6 Unlike Stevens and Ginsberg, Souter and
Breyer agreed with the majority that the Florida court's order violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 7 Like Stevens and Ginsberg, however, Souter and Breyer

President, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 3 U.S.C. § 5, the federal
statutory provision governing the certification of state electors. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103

(2000).
4. One commentator calls it "masterful." See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-HalfCheersfor
Bush v. Gore, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE &THE SUPREME COURT 98, 101 (Cass R. Sunstein &Richard
A. Epstein eds., 2001).
5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
6. Palm Beach County v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1240.
7. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 101.
8. FL. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West 2000).
9. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000).
10. Id.; see Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Dec. 4,2000).
11. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1262 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West 2000)).
12. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 100, 103.
13. Id. at 111.
14. Id. at 100-11.
15. Id. at 111-22.
16. Id. at 123-58.
17. Id. at 123, 133.
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rejected the majority's disposition of the case based on their analysis of 3 U.S.C.
§ 5.18

The legal implications of the 2000 election are sprawling. Indeed, the
discussion is not exhausted by an entire collection of essays onBush v. Gore.9 The
procedural questions raised in the litigation include not only threshold case or
controversy issues like standing 0 and political question,2 but also subsequent
remedial questions, where Article II, Section 1' and 3 U.S.C. § 5' come into play.
Yet after the case or controversy matters and before the remedial issues, the
substantive core of Bush v. Gore is a Fourteenth Amendment issue: whether the
Supreme Court correctly held that the Florida Supreme Court's manual recount
order violates equal protection.24 This limited question will be the primary focus of
this Article. Though several scholars have critiqued the ruling, this Article argues
that the Court basically got it right on the equal protection merits. The Court could
not fully develop its case, of course, since it was under a tight deadline. With the
luxury of time and a range of critiques to answer, I shall attempt to analyze more
fully the equal protection implications raised by Bush v. Gore.'

18. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 130.
19. See THEVOTE: BUSH,GORE, &THE SUPPEME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein
eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE VoTm].
20. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a
Changeable Court, in THE VOTE,supra note 19, at 77, 85-87 (arguing that, not being a registered
Florida voter, Mr. Bush simply could not show the type ofinjury required for standing to challenge the
Florida court's ruling, and thatsometenuous theory of"thirdparty" standing would have been required
to withstand this hurdle). Regardless ofhow amajority of federal courts mighthave ruled on that issue,
none of the dissents even mentioned standing, making it unclearwhether they thought very much of the
argument.
21. See generallySamuel Issacharoff, PoliticalJudgments, in THE VOTE, supra note 19, at 55
(discussing the United States Supreme Court's struggle with the political question doctrine).
22. See generallyRichard A. Epstein, "In such Manner asthe LegislatureThereofMay Direct":
The Outcome in Bush v.Gore Defended, in THE VOTE, supra note 19, at 13,14 (discussing Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution as a basis for the decision).
23. SeegenerallyIssacharoffsupra note 21, at 65-66,70-72 (discussing the federal election laws
discussed in the decision).
24. I recognize that equal protection, in an important sense, is not a substantive question. The
clause commits government to provide no benefits orburdens, requiring simply that ifthe government
dispenses a given benefit or burden, it must do so roughly equally. At the same time, equal protection
cannot simply be considered a rule of procedure on par with, say, a statute of limitations. One might
safely situate it in the middle ofthe substance/procedure continuum, and to that extent we may, for our
purposes, consider it a relatively substantive issue, particularly as concerns this litigation.
25. It may be that even if I am right on the equal protection issue, the Court's disposition of the
case is ultimately indefensible. As the majority admits, "[t]he only disagreement is as to the remedy,"
and its application of3 U.S.C. § 5 seems barely plausible. Bush v.Gore, 531 U.S. at 111. However, this
complex issue is beyond the scope of this Article. My goal here is simply to advance the dialogue in
one sphere of a national debate.
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CRITIQUES OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION RULING

A. Bush v. Gore Has "No Basis in Precedent"
The majority and concurring opinions divide their work. While the concurrence
focuses on Article II, Section 1 and 3 U.S.C. § 5,26 the majority opinion
concentrates on equal protection.27 The majority opinion identifies the issue it must
address as "whether the recount procedures the Florida Supreme Court has adopted
are consistent with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the
members of its electorate."28 Citing four precedents that invalidated burdens on
voting rights under equal protection, it concludes that the recount procedures were
not.29 However, as Karlan writes, "A common thread [in the scholarship] has been
that the Court's equal protection analysis 'had no basis in precedent.' 3 Since
consistency with precedent is an important measure of a ruling's legitimacy, I will
examine whether the scholars are right about this conclusion.
In Gray,3' Reynolds, 32 and Moore,33 the Court invalidated state action that
diluted the voting power of citizens in relatively populous districts or counties, thus
offending the principle of "one person, one vote. 34 In Reynolds, the Alabama
legislature failed to reapportion state legislative districts despite great demographic
shifts in the 60 years since the original apportionment. 3 Chief Justice Warren
wrote:

26. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111-22.
27. Id. at 103-11.
28. Id. at 105.
29. See id. at 104-07 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814
(1969)).
30. Karlan, supra note 20, at 77 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in THE VOTE,
supra note 19, at 205, 207).
31. 372 U.S. at 381.
32. 377 U.S. at 586-87.
33. 394 U.S. at 819.
34. Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
35. 377 U.S. at 540. As the Court summed up the problem in Gray, "Georgia gives every qualified
voter one vote in a statewide election; but in counting those votes she employs the county unit system
which in end result weights the rural vote more heavily than the urban vote and weights some small
rural counties heavier than other larger rural counties." 372 U.S. at 379. In Moore, Justice Douglas
wrote the following for the majority:
Under this Illinois law the electorate in 49 of the counties which contain
93.4% of the registered voters may not form a new political party and place its
candidates on the ballot. Yet 25,000 of the remaining 6.6% of registered voters
properly distributed among the 53 remaining counties may form a new party to
elect candidates to office. This law thus discriminates against the residents of the
populous counties of the State in favor of rural sections. It, therefore, lacks the
equality to which the exercise of political rights is entitled under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
394 U.S. at 819.
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[We have] repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a
constitutionally protected right to vote and to have their votes
counted....
IT]he right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the
franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other
basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously
scrutinized. Almost a century ago ... the Court referred to "the

political franchise of voting" as "a fundamental political right,
because preservative of all rights."
... "To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in
another would . . . run counter to our fundamental ideas of

democratic government ......
. . . [R]epresentative government is in essence selfgovernment through the medium of elected representatives of the
people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full
and effective participation in the political processes of his State's
legislative bodies ....
Full and effective participation by all
citizens in state government requires ... that each citizen have an

equally effective voice in the election of members of his state
legislature. Modem and viable state government needs, and the
Constitution demands, no less.
Simply

stated, an individual's right to

vote

.

.

.

is

unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial
fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in
other parts of the State.36
Several related ideas emerge here, but perhaps key for our purposes is that
voting is a fundamental right, an alleged burden that triggers strict scrutiny upon
equal protection challenge. Yet the critics attack this proposition in several ways.

36. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554, 561-565, 568 (citations omitted).
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While some simply dismiss the ruling under the guise of lack of precedent,37 others
provide forceful arguments for their claim.
As a matter of law, some assert that only state action involving a suspect
classification, and not that burdening a fundamental right,38 triggers strict scrutiny
upon an equal protection challenge.39 Since no suspect classification was shown in
Bush v. Gore, the implication is that the facts simply yield no Fourteenth
Amendment cause of action. In this connection, Epstein targets the majority's
citation to Harper,in which the Court struck down a small poll tax, even though the
proceeds were to be used for virtually unassailable purposes like public education.'
Epstein writes:
At root it looks as though Harperrests on the proposition that
voting rights are so fundamental that they cannot be abridged on
account of wealth. Be that as it may, Harperhas scant relevance
to the probity of Florida's recount procedures. It is one thing to
find a serious affront to equal protection from a wealth test that is
uniform in its application but disparate in its impact. It is quite
another to find an equal protection violation in a process that does

37. Referencing both Reynolds and Harper,Sunstein claims:
The cases that the Court invoked on behalf of the equal protection
holding ... were entirely far afield. To be sure, the absence of precedential
support is not decisive; perhaps theproblem had simply never arisen. Butmanual
recounts arefar from uncommon, and no one had ever thought that the
Constitution requires that they be administered under clear and specific
standards.
Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in THE VOTE, supra note 19, at 205, 213 (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added).
Sunstein's claims have at least two problems. First, this case involved a federal election, in fact
a presidential election, the only one in which the whole country has a direct stake. The federal interest
in a process consistent with the Constitution is thus at its apex, and so the degree of concern that may
characterize other elections does not necessarily control. The fact that manual recounts are "far from
uncommon" is thus not dispositive.
Second, that "no one had ever thought that the Constitution requires ... clear and specific
standards" for manual recounts simply does not establish that it must forever remain a constitutional
nonissue. Id. The rulings in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Brown v. Bd.
ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) were also unprecedented, but that hardly makes them illegitimate. Courts
have regularly checked state action burdening fundamental rights, particularly in the voting rights
context, where the Court has tolerated relatively little imperfection. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725, 740-44 (1983). If asked to review the use of punchcards in one county and optical scanners in
another, with the corresponding gaps in margins oferror, the Courtmighthave invalidated them as well.
Courts have often struck down established practices simply because a set of facts forcing their close
constitutional examination finally invited the Court's scrutiny. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
959 (1983) (holding that the congressional veto provision is unconstitutional).
38. See infra text accompanying note 42.
39. Thus, Issacharoff claims that "the fundamental rights line of cases from the 1960's... essentially
collapsed ofits own weight decades ago.... [S]uspect classifications [have become] the sole effective source
of equal protection redress .... Issacharoff, supranote 21, at 68-69.
40. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664-70 (1966).
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not take into account wealth (or for that matter, race) in deciding
what counts as a valid vote. In a word, the Floridascheme is
devoid of any suspect classificationneeded to trigger the equal
1
protection analysis."
Two responses are in order. First, Epstein fails to show that Harperis not on
point. To be sure, the ruling seems to rest on both the fundamental right and suspect
classification triggers of strict scrutiny.4' Yet the status of voting as a fundamental
right was essential to Harper.In response to the argument that "a State may exact
fees from citizens for many different kinds of licenses,"'43 the Court recognized
voting's fundamental nature by distinguishing it from the acquisition of a driver's
license.' The Court noted that "the interest of the State, when it comes to voting,
is limited to the power to fix qualifications."4 In other words, had Harpersimply

involved a fee payment, i.e., a wealth classification, as a prerequisite for obtaining
a license, the outcome would have been different.
Second, and more importantly, Epstein (and Issacharoff) appear to misstate the
law. As Reynolds and later cases clarify, a suspect classification is not the sole
trigger of heightened scrutiny upon an equal protection challenge." State action
burdening a fundamental right will also suffice, and the critics cite not a single case
announcing the Court's retreat from this pillar of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. Yet this lack of Supreme Court authority is not surprising, for only
as recently as 1986, the Court's liberal wing solidly reaffirmed that state action
burdening a fundamental right is sufficient for strict scrutiny upon equal protection
challenge.47
Attorney GeneralofNew York v. Soto-Lopez" involved New York's denial of
veterans' civil service preference to those who otherwise qualified but had not been
residents of New York when they entered military service. 49 The Court held that
this denial unconstitutionally burdened the right of interstate travel, long recognized

41. Epstein, supra note 22, at 15-16 (emphasis added).
42. The Court concluded as follows in Harper.
We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are
asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications whichmight invade or
restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.
Those principles apply here. For to repeat, wealth or fee paying has, in our
view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental, to be so burdened or conditioned.
383 U.S. at 670 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 668.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566-68 (1963); see also infra text accompanying note
50 (quoting Justice Brennan in Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986)).
47. See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904.
48. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
49. Id. at 900.
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as a fundamental right." What is a fundamental right?-a basic right, a
constitutionally protected right. As Justice Brennan wrote for the Court,
"'[F]reedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a
basic right under the Constitution.' 5 Brennan then stated that "[w]henever a state
law infringes a constitutionally protected right, we undertake intensified equal
protection scrutiny of that law."5 2
Three things are noteworthy here. First, though the Constitution does not
explicitly grant the right to travel, Justice Brennan held that it implied this right.53
This conclusion seems correct. Indeed, the political and economic system enshrined
by the Constitution is incoherent without the right to travel. This right is essential
to the nation's social and commercial well-being.
Second, though Soto-Lopez involved the right to travel, the right to vote is

equally fundamental. While the Constitution does not grant the right expressly, it
is clearly implied as is the right to travel.54 Madisonian Republicanism would be an
utter sham in the absence of widely and equally diffused voting power. Thus, as the
Bush majority wrote, "[T]he right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is
fundamental .... Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State
may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over

that of another." 5

50. Id. at 911; see also Hooper v. Bemalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612,623 (1985) (holding
that the New Mexico veterans tax exemption statute violates the Equal Protection Clause); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55,65 (1982) (holding that the Alaska dividend distribution plan violates the Equal
Protection Clause); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634 (1969) (holding that a statutory provision
denying welfare assistance to those who have not resided in the jurisdiction for one year is
unconstitutional).
51. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 901 (alteration in original) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
338 (1972)).
52. Id. at 904.
53. Id. at 902-03.
54. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (reaffirming that even the right to
vote in a school district election is so fundamental as to require strict scrutiny of state action that
burdens it). A fortiori, the same is true of the right to vote in a federal election, particularly for
President. As John Hart Ely comments, "The right to vote in various federal elections is adverted to in
several constitutional provisions, and whatever additional content Article IV's Republican Form of
Government Clause may have, at a bare minimum it means that states must hold popular elections."
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 118 n.* (1980).
55. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000). While this Article is essentially a response to the
essays in The Vote, Justice Ginsberg's comments on the equal protection issue merit abriefreply at this
point. To support her claim that "petitioners have notpresented a substantial equal protection violation,"
Ginsberg quotes McDonaldv. Bd. ofElection Comm 'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) for the proposition
that "even in the context of the right to vote, the state is permitted to reform 'one step at a time."'
(quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,489 (1955)). Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). However, neither of these cases involved a burden on a fundamental
right. McDonaldinvolved the claimed right to receive an absentee ballot, which Chief Justice Warren
expressly distinguished from the right to vote. McDonald,394 U.S. at 803. Williamson involved the
claimed right of opticians to refit old eyeglass lenses into new frames, hardly a fundamental right.
Williarnson, 348 U.S. at 485. Thus, the Court applied mere rational basis scrutiny in both cases. By
definition, the standards ofpermissible legislative action or inaction underrational basis scrutiny do not
apply where fundamental rights are burdened; rather strict scrutiny applies where fundamental rights
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Third, "intensified scrutiny" means strict, not intermediate, scrutiny. 6 As
Justice Brennan wrote, "once we find a burden on the right to migrate, the standard
of review is the same. Laws which burden that right must be necessary to further
a compelling state interest.""7
Therefore, the critics are mistaken that, absent a suspect classification, aburden
on voting rights cannot trigger strict scrutiny. Thus, the Bush majority correctly
applied strict scrutiny to the Florida court's order of manual recounts under the
"intent of the voter" standard.58 As Brennan noted, a compelling interest is required
for state action to survive the ends prong of strict scrutiny. 9 Therefore, the
immediate question is whether Florida had such an interest in this gap in its election
code, which allows identical votes to be counted in one county but not in another."'
The majority's answer is clear and not surprising, but the weakness of Florida's
(and the critics') position is driven home by Justice Souter's view of the matter. As
one of the swing votes, he has the credibility that comes from being in the center,
and as he writes in his dissent, "I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served
by these differing treatments of the expressions of voters' fundamental rights. The
differences appear wholly arbitrary."'" That a swing vote could not find even a
permissible interest, nevermind the compelling interest required to satisfy strict
scrutiny, underscores the difficulty in discrediting the equal protection ruling in
Bush v. Gore.6
Yet the critics question the authority flowing from the precedents in other
ways. Referencing a passage from Reynolds that "[f]ull and effective participation
by all citizens in state government requires... that each citizen have an equally
effective voice,"'63 Issacharoff asserts that "it remains unclear thirty-five years later
what are the precise parameters of this claimed right."' Given the "amorphousness

are burdened.
56. For an elaboration of intermediate scrutiny, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98
(1976) (explaining the standard of scrutiny involved in a gender-based equal protection challenge).
57. Soto-Lopez,476 U.S. at 904-05, n.4. In Bush v. Gore,the "[l] aw[]whichburden[s] [the] right"
is the Florida Supreme Court order that the recounts shall be conducted in accord with the "intent ofthe
voter" standard. See 531 U.S. at 102.
58. Thus, McConnell sums up the law correctly when he observes that "[t]he right to vote has
been recognized as a fundamental right, and strict scrutiny is applied to ensure that every citizen within
thejurisdictionis treated precisely equally with regard to that right." McConnell, supra note 4, at 105.
59. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904-05 n.4. As Ely adds, "[I]t
is ...
incumbent on the courts to ensure
not only that no one is denied the vote for no reason, but also that where there is a reason (as there will
be) it had better be a very convincing one." ELY, supra note 54, at 120.
60. Justice Stevens' point that most states provide nothing more than the intent of the voter
standard does not, ofcourse, answerthe objection. See Bushy. Gore, 531 U.S. at 125 n.2. For example,
at one time, most states had no laws against racial discrimination.
61. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting).
62. Since the ends prong is not satisfied, it is unnecessary and indeed impossible to examine
whether the means sufficiently advance the end. The recount order under the "intent of the voter"
standard thus fails strict scrutiny and is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.
63. Reynolds v.Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
64. Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 69.
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of the claimed fundamental right to vote,"6 his inference seems to be that the right
to vote either does not exist or has not been violated in this case.
The fact that a right's exact contours are not clear, of course, does not establish
that it does not exist or is unenforceable in a given case. Constitutional rights, by
nature, are forged over time, and many important rights have been protected even
while still unavoidably amorphous.66 Although the rulings in Reynolds, Gray, and
Ogilvie may be imperfect on this account, if the Court properly found equal
protection violations in these cases (and the critics have not shown or even argued
otherwise),67 then the same is true in Bush. The problem in Bush is not vote
dilution, as in the earlier cases, yet that difference renders it a greater, not a lesser,
Fourteenth Amendment violation. While the voting power of certain individuals
was diminishedin those earlier cases, many Florida citizens would have had their
votes completely denied under the Florida Supreme Court's "intent of the voter"
standard.6" One whose vote is not counted loses all, not just part, of his political
voice. Therefore, those who reject the Bush ruling without discrediting Reynolds
and its progeny claim that only the lesser burden on the franchise violates equal
protection. Such an inconsistency seems hard to justify.69
Yet the critics still attempt to distinguish the precedents on other grounds. Even
if voting is a fundamental right, its burden is subject to strict scrutiny, and its
amorphousness does not render it unenforceable," they note two things. First, we
do not know exactly whose votes were being denied in Florida, and second, there
was no proof of the state's conscious intent to burden voting rights. As Ronald
Dworkin writes, "[A] general standard for counting undervotes that may be applied
differently in different districts puts no class of voters, in advance, at either an
advantage or disadvantage."'" Epstein elaborates on this issue:
[T]he per curiam citation to Reynolds v. Sims... runs far afield.
That case dealt with the refusal of state legislatures to reapportion
themselves, in ways that perpetuated massive differences in the
size of legislative districts. The obvious imbalance is that all

65. Id. at 68.
66. The evolution of the constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech, and the right to
counsel, to name a few, illustrate the point.
67. Indeed, even Elizabeth Garrett praises the Court's action in the Reynolds decision. See
Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE, supra note 19, at 38, 40.
68. As McConnell observes, "[To treat one voter's ballot as a legal vote and another voter's
identical ballot as spoiled, in the samejurisdiction, for no conceivable public purpose, certainly states
a plausible equal protection claim." McConnell, supranote 4, at 116. This point is further underscored
by Karcher v. Daggett,462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983), which imposed strict equality in the legislative
redistricting context, striking down even a minor variance in vote dilution.
69. As Ely writes, "Discussions of the meaning of 'democracy,' no matter how scrupulous they
are about noting the existence ofsome variations in understanding, seem invariably to include political
equality, or the principle that everyone's vote is to count for the same, in their core definition." ELY,
supra note 54, at 122.
70. See Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 68-70.
71. Ronald Dworkin, A Badly FlawedElection, N.Y. Rav. OF BooKs, Jan. 11, 2001, at 53, 54.
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individuals who reside in populous counties systematically have
much less political influence than their peers who reside in less
populous counties.
It is possible therefore to identify
unambiguously the winners and losers from the state practice,
and to demand in principle at least some justification for
imbalances consciously perpetuated by the refusal of the
dominant legislative coalition to initiate electoral reforms that
would necessarily cut into its own power.
That situation bears scant resemblance to the Bush versus
Gore dispute .... No one in Floridapracticed a conscious

manipulation of the voting standardthat necessarily skews the
outcome in favor of one region, or even one group.72
The first claim, that the burden falls on no identifiable group, is certainly true.
Since voting is performedprivately, a given Florida citizen could not know whether
her vote in the 2000 election was going to be counted. However, given the counties'
ballot counting methods, we know with certainty that, as a result of a recount,
identical ballots would have been treated differently depending on a citizen's
residence. As a twist on the problem above, the critics' position is that mere vote
dilution is impermissible if we know whose votes are burdened, but complete vote
denial is permissible simply because the identities ofthose affected are unavoidably

72. Epstein, supranote 22, at 16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Similarly Sunstein notes
that there is no "sign of discrimination against ...
members ofany identifiable group." Sunstein, supra
note 37, at 213. Michelman adds:
So far as I am aware, in no case prior to Bush v. Gore has the Court recognized
a claim to unequal protection of voting rights in which there was on the state's
part no implicit or explicit act ofwhat the jargon calls "classification"--that is,
ex ante division of a population of actual or would-be voters into groups ... to
whose members the state accords differentially advantageous treatment within the
voting scheme....
[O]f exactly what maltreatment [could a voter] have complained? The
bottom line answer is: the chance that her ballot, in the event it fell into a batch
submitted to recount, would undergo appraisal by an intent-of-the-voter standard,
honestly applied by whomever would be applying it. True, her ballot stands
possibly to be rejected by the official who happens to be the one to pick it up,
whereas it might have been accepted if another official had been the one to pick
it up first, because of differing rules of thumb in use by the two, each of them
reasonably and impartially adopted and applied. These are eventualities about
which our voter will never know, and it is not clear why she has any reason to
care about them, either, given that the anticipated vagaries ofballot appraisal are
utterly randomwithrespect topartisan voter interest.... No one's equal dignity
is impugned by this practice ....
Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion,or the New Prince,in THE VOTE, supranote 19, at 123, 129, 135-36.
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unknown. Though a fundamental right is at stake, only the lesser injustice
violates
73
equal protection. As stated above, this position seems hard to justify.
Secondly, the critics assert that the absence of conscious intent to manipulate
voting rights renders the precedents inapplicable.74 The claim seems to be that only
the vote's deliberate dilution, and not its negligent denial (through the state
legislature's failure to have specified adequate standards for manual recounts),
violates equal protection. Yet, why should these two situations be distinguished for
equal protection purposes? Both situations involve fault by public officials that
burdens the exercise of a fundamental right. Again, as Justice Brennan wrote in
Soto-Lopez, "[W]henever a state law infringesa constitutionally protected right, we
undertake intensified equal protection scrutiny of that law." ' "Infringes"
encompasses careless foresight as well as conscious intent, which is appropriate
where fundamental rights are completely denied. Under recent, well-established
precedent, then, mere state inaction-be it the failure to reapportion or to specify
adequate76 recount standards-can constitute an impermissible burden on the right
to vote.
As a final attempt to discredit the majority's equal protection ruling, Issacharoff
alleges that the Court's own behavior belies its knowledge that it is engaged in an
indefensible extension of precedent.7 7 As the majority writes, "Our consideration
is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in
election processes generally presents many complexities. ' 8 Observing that the
"newly articulated equal protection doctrine is dramatically wide reaching,"79
Issacharoff claims that "[t]he difficulty in defining the scope of this new equal
protection right is made all the worse by the Court's disingenuous limiting
instruction.""s

73. McConnell notes "in cases involving fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, the Court
applies strict scrutiny to all disparities, [regardless of] whether the disparities reflect discrimination
against any protected group. Minor and unsystematic variances from precise population equality for
legislative districts injure no identifiable group, but nonetheless violate . . . Equal
Protection." McConnell, supranote 4, at 115-16 (citations omitted). McConnell further explains that
"it could be said that the injured 'group' is residents of the larger districts. But that is analytically
analogous to saying that voters with uncounted votes were the injured group inBush v. Gore."Id.at 116
n.80 (citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983)).
74. See Epstein, supranote 22, at 16-17; Sunstein, supranote 37, at 213; Michelman, supranote
72, at 135-37.
75. 476 U.S. at 904 (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (finding that the Alabama Legislature's
inaction in its failure to reapportion legislative districts unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote).
77. Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 68.
78. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
79. Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 70.
80. Id. David Strauss adds, "The Court's attempt to limit its holding, with barely a fig leaf of
principle, gives the game away." David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking? in THE
VOTE, supra note 19, at 185, 199. In Sunstein's words, "What is missing from the opinion is an
explanation of why the situation in the case is distinctive, and hence to be treated differently from
countless apparently similar situations involving equal protection problems." Sunsteinsupranote 37,
at 214.
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While this limitation may seem suspicious, under the circumstances it was
eminently defensible. Writing under a tight deadline, the Court could not articulate
its judgment as thoroughly and carefully as it could have with more time. It quite
rationally issued a "minimalist" ruling, so to allow itself the flexibility to develop
the scope of the right, whether to expand or restrict it in future adjudications.
Indeed, to do otherwise would have been irresponsible.
I conclude that the critics fail to show that the majority's ruling on the merits
of the equal protection claim is an illegitimate extension of the precedents on which
it relies.
B. Bush v. Gore Has Basis in Precedent,and That's the Bad News
In contrast to the previous critics, Professors Garrett and Karlan concede that
the majority's equal protection ruling is consistent with precedent. However, they
claim that precedent is precisely the problem since the relevant precedents are
illegitimate. In this connection, Garrett cites Buckley v. Valeo,s1 Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, 2 and California Democratic Party v. Jones." She
claims that the Court in these cases entered the "political thicket," lacking both
adequate institutional resources and political understanding.84 Garrett's argument
does not fail on the ground that Buckley, Nixon, and Jones are First Amendment
cases, because the Court in those cases reviewed claims ofburdens on fundamental
rights, as in Bush. However, upon closer examination her critique is still
unpersuasive.
Buckley, of course, is a notoriously troubling case. The Court reviewed
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), a comprehensive scheme
regulating federal campaign finance in the wake of Watergate."5 Though the Court
upheld FECA's limits on contributions to political campaigns for federal office, it
struck down the ceilings FECA imposed on expenditures for such offices on the
theory that spending one's own money is a form of political speech. 6 In other
words, the Court left the statute in tatters and Congress virtually powerless to enact
comprehensive campaign finance reform. 7 We shall return to Buckley, but let us
observe for now that by contrast, Bush did not address an integral, well-considered
component of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, but rather a gap in an election
code that served only to burden a fundamental right.

81. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
82. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
83. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
84. Garrett, supra note 67, at 40-43.
85. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1-2.
86. Id. at 52-53.
87. Speech as money haunts us as much as ever. Even if the McCain-Feingold bill passes the
House, it vill be subject to immediate challenge on free speech grounds, based on the "speech is
money" doctrine.
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Garrett's citation of Nixon is even harder to understand. This case involved
limitations on contributions to campaigns for state office.88 While Nixon certainly
relied on Buckley, it did so in order to uphold rather than to invalidate the state
action."' Bush is thus consistent with Nixon insofar as both decisions function to
protect the integrity of the electoral process, whether by upholding contribution
limits that guard against influence peddling,9" or by ensuring that the fundamental
right to vote is not arbitrarily denied.9 Even more remarkably, Garrett praises
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Nixon, which articulates the "right wing" view that
limitations on contributions are unconstitutional,92 and supports judicial
intervention to invalidate the Missouri statute.93 For someone arguing that the Court
should avoid the political thicket, she chooses'a strange citation of support.
Finally, Jones involved a California state law that had replaced the state's
"closed" primary system, in which only a political party's members can vote on its
nominees, with a "blanket" primary system.94 Under the latter system, each voter's
ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation, allowing the voter to
choose freely among them.95 Like Buckley, the Court in Jones invalidated the law
on First Amendment grounds.96 Yet Garrett concedes that well-informed people
could disagree on the merits of such a case, and that "[tjhe point.., is not that the
Court got the result wrong."97 Rather, she claims that given the Court's
"unsophisticated view of political parties," its "institutional limitations and its
inability to resolve problems comprehensively," it should have declined review.98
For the moment, two responses are in order. First, the ordinary solution for
what Garrett dismisses as the Court's unsophisticated political understanding is
education on the issues by the parties and amici curiae. If there is a failure here, it
may at least partly be those parties'.
Second, Garrett's position is undermined by her praise of Reynolds:
In some cases, notably the voting rights cases, [for example Baker
v. Carrand Reynolds v. Sims] the judicial role can be defended as
necessary to safeguard the equal access of every American to
elected officials and institutions of governance. Even if the
institutional limitations of the adjudicatory process decrease the
possibility that courts can provide comprehensive solutions, on

88.
89.
90.
91.

Nixon, 528 U.S. at 381-82.
Id.
Id. at 397-98.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111.

92. Garrett, supra note 67, at 41.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Nixon, 528 U.S. at 405-10.
530 U.S. at 569-70.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 585-86.
Garrett, supra note 67, at 44.
Id. at 42, 44.
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balance the good done by the judiciary in these cases of political
process failure outweighs the harm.99
If Reynolds is valid, as Garrett admits, and on point, as we have seen it to be,
then the equal protection ruling in Bush is valid as well."' ° Garrett thus paints with
too broad a brush. Of the cases she cites, she can only show Buckley to have been
wrongly decided. And even so, we have seen that Bush is distinguishable from
Buckley. Therefore, Garrett fails to show that the Court wrongly intervened in Bush.
Unlike the other critics, Professor Karlan views Bush neither in the light of
Reynolds and its progeny nor of the campaign finance reform cases. Instead, she
situates Bush within a more recent line of cases, beginning with Shaw v. Reno,'
which "recognized a claim 'analytically distinct' from a vote dilution claim."'0 2 In
Karlan's view, the Shaw cases involve a claim of "'metagovemance,' that is, 0a3
claim about the rules by which the democratic political processes are structured."'
Thus, she labels this claim as "structural" equal protection, in which the clause is
used "not to protect the rights of an individual or discrete group of
individuals .... but rather to regulate the institutional arrangements within which
politics is conducted."'" Karlan claims this approach is an illegitimate theory of
equal protection insofar as it is informed by:
[A] fear of too much democracy, of too robust and tumultuous a
political system.... [T]he Court sees itself as the only institution

fully competent to resolve the difficult questions raised by the
role of race in American democracy ....
ITihe Court's minimalist approach.., in the Shaw cases conveys
a critical message: these cases "really aren't individual rights
lawsuits in the first place. Rather they concern the meaning of
'our system of representative democracy."' Judicial endorsement
of a color-blind conception of democracy necessarily entails
judicial repudiation of the vision of democracy expressed by the
normal majoritarian political process.... The redistricting plans
that the Supreme Court has struck down were the product of a

99. Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
100. Ely singles out First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause issues as those on which the
Court is justified in departing from interpretivism and using a broader mode of constitutional
interpretation in the interest of ensuring that the channels of political change are not choked off. See
ELY, supra note 54, at 105-34.
101. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
102. Millerv. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,911 (1995) (citingShaw,509 U.S. at 652); accordBushv.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1004-05 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,905-08 (1996). These cases involve
equal protection challenges by white voters to the creation of "majority-minority" congressional
districts in the wake of the 1990 census, and under the "preclearance" supervision of the U.S. Justice
Department.
103. Karlan, supra note 20, at 79 (footnote omitted).
104. Id. at78.
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robust political process. They were enacted by fairly elected state
legislatures and were approved by the executive branch of the
federal government pursuant to the authority conferred by a
congressionally enacted statute that rests on the consensus that the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are best enforced by taking
race into account, rather than by claiming colorblindness.... The Voting Rights Act and the various political
realities of contemporary redistricting define self-government in
ways that take into account America's racial and ethnic diversity,
its history ofexclusion, and current realities of racial polarization.
For those of us who spent much of the 1990's preoccupied with
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, Bush v. Gore had an aspect of d~ja
vu all over again." 5
I find problems here at two levels: (1) the narrow question of Bush's
consistency with precedent and (2) the broader issue of Karlan's theory ofjudicial
review.
On the question of precedent, even assuming the Equal Protection Clause
protects group rights,"0 6 Karlan's central claim that the Shaw cases significantly
depart from the Court's equal protection jurisprudence is highly questionable. The
claim depends on which facts we emphasize. The Shaw cases may be "analytically
distinct" from the vote dilution cases, but three facts are noteworthy.0 7
First, Reynolds' itself plausibly involves a metagovernance claim. Though it
began as an assertion of injury to the rights of a discrete group of individuals, the
remedy imposed partook of metagovernance.'0 9 Insofar as reapportionment
redistributes voting power more equally, it exemplifies regulation of "the
institutional arrangements within whichpolitics is conducted."" 0 Even if Shawmay
be characterized this way, then, so can Reynolds. Therefore, the Shaw cases are not
clearly illegitimate on this account.
Second, the underlying rationale for the approach in the Shaw cases was that
the type of state action at issue, official segregation based on race, had long been

105. Id. at 78, 80-81 (footnotes omitted).

106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I explicitly grants full protection to "any person", i.e., the
individual human being, regardless of his racial group membership. Thus, the Court wrote in Miller,
"At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens 'as individuals, not as "simply components ofa racial, religious, sexual
or national class.'"" 515 U.S. at 911 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)); see also Martin D. Carcieri, The Wages of Taking Bakke Seriously: The
Untenable Denialof the Primacy ofthe Individual, 67 TENN. L.Rv. 949, 952 (2000) (noting debate
among scholars as to whether equal protection clauseprovides rights to individuals rather than groups).
107. See Karlan, supra note 20, at 79 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 652).
108. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
109. Id. at 577-87.
110. Karlan, supra note 20, at 78.
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a special concern of the Equal Protection Clause. Brown v. Board of Education"'
recognized the presumptive illegitimacy of this practice," 2 and the Court elaborated
on the principle in Miller:
[T]he essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw is
that the State has used race as a basis for separating voters into
districts. Just as the State may not, absent extraordinary

justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public
parks, buses, golf courses, beaches, and schools so did we
recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its citizens into
different voting districts on the basis of race."'
Third, the factual predicate justifying strict scrutiny in the Shaw cases is firmly
grounded in landmark equal protection precedent. As the Court wrote in Bush v.
Vera," 4 "For strict scrutiny to apply, theplaintiffs must prove that other, legitimate
districting principles were 'subordinated' to race. By that, we mean that race must
be 'the predominantfactor motivating the legislature's [redistricting] decision.'""s
This allowance of race as one, but only one, factor in governmental decisionmaking
parallels the Court's allowance, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke," 6 of race or ethnicity as one of many permissible factors that selective
public universities may use in deciding whom to admit." 7 As Justice Powell wrote
in his controlling opinion:

111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112. Id. at 495.
113. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (citations omitted).
114. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
115. Id. at 959 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,
905 (1996) (finding court's standard ofproving motive for districting was race and was compatible with
Miller standard); Miller, 515 U.S. at 916-17 (stating plaintiff must prove race was basis for district
restructuring); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 645 (1993) (stating strict scrutiny standard used when
districts alleged to be determined based upon race).
Karlan's description of the 1965 Voting Rights Act as a "a congressionally enacted statute that
rests on the consensus that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are best enforced by taking race
into account, rather thanby claiming color-blindness," thus simplyblurs the well-established distinction
between race as one of many factors and race as the predominant factor in governmental
decisionmaking. Karlan, supranote 20, at 81. She also distorts what both Congress and the Court have
done. As for the former, had there really been a consensus in Congress in the mid-1960s that "the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are best enforced by taking race into account," then the express
nondiscrimination language in the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act is hard to
account for. As for the latter, the Court in Shaw and its progeny never declare color-blindness a fact of
the world, but rather simply state that it is the express standard by which government is presumptively
to operate. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642-44.
116. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
117. Id.at 320. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell struck down the rigid set aside of 16 ofevery
100 seats in the Medical School ofthe University California at Davis entering class only for members
ofcertain races and ethnicities, yet held that race and ethnicity may be used as one factor among many
in the public university admissions process. Id. at 318-20.
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Ethnic diversity... is only one element in a range of factors
a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a
heterogenous student body....
...[T]he diversity that furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a
single... element....
...[R]ace or ethnic background is simply one element-to
be weighed fairly against other elements-in the selection
process."'

Just as Powell recognized the dangers posed by assuming that human diversity
begins and ends with race, the Court explained in Shaw v. Reno that a
reapportionment plan based primarily on race
reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group--regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live-think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.
We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible
racial stereotypes." 9
Given these links between the Shaw cases and established Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, Karlan's claim of its surface inconsistency is not
persuasive. To the contrary, Shaw and its progeny are fimnly grounded in equal
protection precedent, and the majority's ruling in Bush is not invalid for its
consistency with Shaw.
As for the broader implications of Karlan's argument, we saw that she speaks
of the Court's "fear of too much democracy" and the "judicial repudiation of the
vision of democracy expressed by the normal majoritarian political process. ''120
However, these words imply a distorted, one-dimensional view of the Constitution.
To be sure, the presumptive legitimacy of majority rule is the irreducible minimum
of democracy in any form.' 2 ' Yet American democracy is far from exhausted by
118. Id. at 314-15, 318.
119. 509 U.S. at 647; see also Miller,515 U.S. at 911-12 (stating that the Constitution requires
that Government treat persons as individuals, not as part of a racial group).
120. Karlan, supra note 20, at 78, 80. Jeffrey Rosen, Legal Affairs Editor of The New Republic,
makes the same troubling claim in some of his recent articles. See Jeffrey Rosen, OurDiscriminating
Court: FederalOffense, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 9 & 16, 2001, at 24, 24-26; Jeffrey Rosen, For
Race in Class: WithoutMerit,THENEw REPUBLIC, May 14,2001, at 20, 20,22; Jeffrey Rosen, Rating
W.'sJudges: Bench Press, THE NEw REPUBLIC, June 18, 2001, at 12, 12, 14.
121. If this majoritarian consensus in favor ofrace-based decisionmaking by government truly
exists, such that the Supreme Court has undemocratically struck down state action in which race is the
predominant factor, then a constitutional amendment ridding federal statutory law and Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence of the nondiscrimination standard should not be difficult to obtain. Yet
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majority rule, even (perhaps especially) where elected representatives seek to
impose race-based differential treatment by government. Judicial review is an
integral component of our constitutional scheme and the debate over its abolition,
the "counter-majoritarian difficulty"'122 notwithstanding, is long over. Judicial
review enabled the Court to intervene in Brown v. Board ofEducation,2 3 and as
Chief Justice Warren wrote in Reynolds v. Sims, "We are cautioned about the
dangers of entering into political thickets ....
Our answer is this: a denial of
constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our
office require no less of us.' 24
Thus, the contemporary debate overjudicial review concerns not its existence,
but rather its scope; however, the critics' arguments as to scope are no better.
Garrett's claim that the Court must decline review where it cannot "resolve
problems comprehensively"'" is no more plausible than Karlan's claim that the
"democratic" outcomes of the "majoritarian political process" should not be
disturbed.'26 Again, Brown is instructive: though the Court could hardly have
expected to resolve comprehensively either public education or race relations, it
properly intervened. To Karlan's point, one might simply reply that the majoritarian
political process of mid-century Topeka produced the view that given the current
realities of racial polarization, segregating white and black students is preferable.
However, again the Court properly intervened, since by 1954 the Justices clearly
saw that race is presumptively an illegitimate basis of state action, even if a
majority thinks otherwise.'27

critics know that at least two problems exist here. First, polls consistently show that while most
Americans are sympathetic to the goals of affirmative action, they disfavor race-based differential
treatmentby governmentto achieve them. Second, even assuming amajoritarian consensus in favor of
race-based differential treatment by government, how would such an amendment even be
worded-Congress shallbe allowed to grant preferences to women and people ofcolorin the allocation
of public resources? The political will does not even exist to change the wording of Title VII to this
effect, much less to amend the Constitution to this effect. Thus, the claim of majoritarian consensus
favoring the official use of race as a major factor in governmental decisionmaking rings hollow.
122. See ALEXANDERM. BICKEL,THELEASTDANGEROUSBRANCH 16-23 (1962) (explaining that
the judicial branch is a counter-majoritarian check on the legislative and executive branches).
123. 347U.S. 483,486-87n.1, 488(1954). This intervention, in turn, gave Congress the political
cover to enact the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
124. 377 U.S. 533,566 (1964); see alsoMiller,515 U.S. at 922-23 (stating it is the responsibility
of the judiciary, not a political branch, to enforce protections given under Constitution).
125. Garrett, supra note 67, at 44.
126. See Karlan,supra note 20, at 80.
127. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Karlan might claim that Brown is not on point here since the
composition of any state or local legislature in the pre-Voting Rights Act South is suspect. While this
claim has merit, let us ask why she claims the legislatures that produced the redistricting plans
invalidated in Shaw and its progeny were "fairly elected"? Simply because they were elected following
the Voting Rights Act? Fair enough, but that still does not establish Karlan's fundamental, underlying
point that whatever they do is constitutional, and judicial review of their action is illegitimate. Even a
"fairly elected" legislature can enact unconstitutional legislation.
Karlan's position is troubling in light of another landmark decision. She insists on judicial
deference to the political branches where a policy "taking race into account, rather than... claiming
color-blindness" has been "approvedby the executive branch ofthe federal governmentpursuant to the
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I conclude that Professor Karlan has shown neither that Shaw and its progeny
2
are illegitimate nor that Bush v. Gore is invalid for its consistency with them. 1
III. CONCLUSION
The critics do not seriously discredit the Supreme Court's equal protection
ruling in Bush v. Gore. However, the ultimate question is that of remedy, the full
treatment of which is well beyond the scope of this article. Even assuming that the
Court's remedial disposition of the case under 3 U.S.C. § 5129 is plausible, it may
be that the principles underlying the decision are in conflict. Whereas the principle
at the root of the equal protection ruling seems to be that all votes should count
equally (the rule of the people), the principle underlying the application of 3 U.S.C.
§ 5 is the importance of finality and closure (the rule of law). While these are both
fundamentally valid principles in our constitutional scheme, and while both may
be fairly applicable within a given case, it just seems more legitimate when the
Court consistently relies on one or the other within the same case. Where it does
not, this conflict of principles cannot help but to raise the suspicion that the Court
has engaged in result-oriented jurisprudence. Whether or not this suspicion is
justified, the Court surely suffers as a result of the perception.

authority conferred by a congressionally enacted statute." Karlan, supra note 20, at 81 (footnote
omitted). However, these facts describe Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, a
constitutional challenge was brought against a civilian exclusion order under which all Americans of
Japanese ancestry in certain West Coast military areas were to be removed to internment camps. Id. at
215-16. The government argued that since the country was at war with Japan and since it was certain
that at least some Japanese Americans were engaged in espionage and sabotage, the exclusion order was
justified under military necessity. Id. at 217. This order is one ofthe sad chapters ofour history not only
because U.S. military authorities issued the order (pursuant to an Executive Order and an Act of
Congress), but also because the Supreme Court upheld that order against constitutional challenge. See
id. at 223-24. Though it took forty years, the United States finally made reparations to the survivors of
the internment camps. See WILLIAM COHEN & DAVID J. DANELSKI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CIVIL
LIBERTY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 968 (4th ed. 1997); OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR. & JOHN M. SCHEB, II,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 199 (2d. ed. 1999). Like Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (1 How.)
393 (1857) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Korematsu is now generally regarded as one
of the Court's worst mistakes. See, e.g., Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law:
The Supreme Court Moves From Applying Internment of Japanese Americans to Disapproving
Affirmative Actionfor African Americans, I MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 165, 165 (1996) ("[Korematsu] is
one of the 'justly infamous episode[s]' in the history of the American judiciary,"quoting Laurence
Tribe). I submitthata theory ofjudicial review inconsistent with Brown but consistent with Korematsu
is on weak ground.
128. Some may object that I am being inconsistent insofar as I justify the fundamental rights
strand of strict scrutiny in response to the earlier scholars, but now justify the legitimacy of the Shaw
cases based on their continuity with precedent via race as a suspect classification. I respond that the
equal protection ruling in Bush v. Gore is justified precisely because both of these are true: a burden
on fundamental rights does trigger strict scrutiny, and Shaw and its progeny are legitimate extensions
of precedent, such that Bush v. Gore is consistent with several lines of valid precedent.
129. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). I do not mention U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 since only the concurrence
rested its decision in part on this provision.
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